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ABSTRACT
Rescue cases involving guarantees (contrasted with restructuring cases) during the recent Financial 
Crisis, have illustrated the prominent position which the goal of promoting financial stability has 
assumed over that of the prevention or limitation of possible distortions of competition which may 
arise when granting State aid. 
The recent Financial Crisis has also illustrated how the traditional role of central banks has been 
extended to incorporate more innovative roles. The reduction of interest rates by central banks to all 
time lows – along with other unprecedented actions which have been undertaken by central banks, 
as  evidenced  by  the  recent  Financial  Crisis,  have  been  regarded  as  „extensions  of  traditional 
methods of operation which have resulted in a new territory in which tools have been implemented 
in very new ways.“ 
As well as providing an analysis of how the traditional role of central banks has evolved through the 
duration  of  the  Financial  Crisis,  this  paper  attempts  to  highlight  how  far  central  banks  and 
governments should intervene and how far distortions of competition should be permitted during 
periods of financial crises.
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A. Introduction
It is argued that competition assessments – whether carried out only by the competition authority or 
in  conjunction with the financial  sector  regulator,  are  vital  for  state  aid  applications  and many 
emergency measures which may have been established by governments.2 Whether new regulatory 
procedures which are to be introduced will facilitate “meaningful competition assessments” to be 
made within the available time period during times of crises, constitutes a topic of controversial 
dimensions and such controversy is also acknowledged.3
Up till the 1980s, it was widely acknowledged that competition contributed to the deterioration of 
financial stability – intense competition was particularly considered to favour excessive levels of 
risk taking – hence contributing to higher risks of individual bank failures.4 However it has been 
recently observed that “panic runs can occur independently of the degree of competition in the 
market.”5
Certain views regarding contributory factors to financial crises and particularly financial instability, 
embrace criticisms of the monetary policies established by central banks. The standard argument 
advanced by critics of monetary policies during past financial crises, relates to the fact that “interest 
rates were kept too low for too long and that this created for investors, both an incentive and a 
possibility to take excessive risks.”6 A further criticism of monetary policy is attributed to the fact 
that investors are encouraged to believe that monetary policies will always bail them out in times of 
financial difficulties.7
Whilst the need to promote and maintain financial stability is paramount, safeguards need to be 
implemented and enforced to ensure that measures geared towards the aim of sustaining system 
stability (measures such as lender of last  resort  arrangements and State rescues) do not unduly 
distort competition as well as induce higher risk taking levels. This paper will draw attention to 
safeguards which have been provided by the Commission where approval is considered for the 
grant of State aid to financial institutions whose problems are attributable to inefficiencies, poor 
asset liability management or risky strategies. In a previous paper,8 safeguards which are in place to 
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2 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the Financial Markets: Key Findings” 
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burst.” See ibid
8Please particularly refer to section four of the paper (by the author) “Liquidity Assistance and the Provision of State 
Aid to Financial Institutions” (2010) Munich RePEc and SSRN Working Papers
ensure that  competition is  not  distorted were considered under  section four  of  the  paper.  Such 
safeguards, as considered in the paper, are applicable both to financial institutions whose viability 
problems are exogenously induced (and also related to extreme conditions which prevail  in the 
financial market), as well as those financial institutions whose endogenous problems are related to 
inefficiency or excessive risk- taking. The paper also considered the rationale for the distinction 
between these institutions and concluded that financial institutions whose problems are attributable 
to inefficiencies, poor asset liability management or risky strategies should be accorded the same 
treatment as those whose viability problems are exogenously induced (and also related to extreme 
conditions  which  prevail  in  the  financial  market)  as  far  as  such  „non  fundamentally  sound“ 
institutions are considered to be systemically relevant.
Whether  the  distinction  drawn by the  Commission  –  with  regards  to  the  preferential  grant  of 
recapitalisation packages to fundamentally sound banks (which require less restructuring measures) 
is justified, will be considered in this paper.
This paper is structured as follows: Subsequent to the introductory section and under the second 
section, prominence is given to highlighting the distinction between fundamentally sound financial 
institutions and those not considered to be fundamentally sound. In this respect, the preferential 
grant of recapitalisation schemes to fundamentally sound financial institutions will be emphasised. 
The third section will then consider measures which have been established as means of minimising 
and avoiding distortions of competition. The third section will also consider the extent to which the 
objective of promoting financial stability should override that of the need to minimise distortions of 
competition. This section is structured into four parts: 
I. Safeguards Against Possible Distortions of Competition in Recapitalisation Schemes
II. Prevention and Limitation of Undue Distortions of Competition.
III. Exit Strategies to Address Distortions to Competition Instituted by Crisis Responses
IV. Recapitalisation  Schemes  in  Respect  of  Non  Fundamentally  Sound  Institutions  and  the 
Grant  of State  Capital:  The Objective of Fostering Competition Overriding the Need to 
Promote Financial Stability?
The fourth section will  then consider the reasons behind the increasing prominence of the role 
assumed by central banks in regulation – in their capacities as regulator, monetary policy setters and 
lender of last resort providers. Such a consideration will be facilitated through an overview of the 
impact of the recent Financial Crisis.
Should  lender  of  last  resort  arrangements  be  granted  to  a  wider  extent  under  complementary 
arrangements which support recapitalisation schemes than those which support guarantee schemes 
or vice versa?  What  are  the benefits  of expanding the role  of central  banks as opposed to  the 
disadvantages of increased central bank intervention in rescues? These are amongst several points 
to be deliberated on in this section before a conclusion is drawn in the fifth and final section of the 
paper.
According  to  Aaken  and Kurtz,  the  most  frequently  taken  emergency measures  with  „specific 
relevance to state  commitments under international  economic law“, can be classified into three 
extensive categories namely, i)measures designed to bolster the stability of the financial services 
industry;  ii)  measures  directed  at  the  financial  services  industry  but  structured  to  increase  the 
availability  of  credit  to  other  sectors  of  the  economy;  and  (iii)  measures  targeting  select  and 
strategic industries.9
B. State Aids and Recapitalisation Schemes
Article 107 (1) TFEU [ex Article 87(1) EC]10 considers “state aid” to be any aid granted by a 
Member State or (ii) through state resources in any form whatsoever and which (iii) distorts or 
threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings as far as it affects trade between 
Member States.11
The Commission’s resort to the “rarely used and more lenient provision of Article 87(3)(b) EC 
Treaty, during the recent Financial Crisis, to authorise national recovery plans and individual rescue 
measures”12 is an explicit illustration of its commitment to goals aimed at facilitating economic 
stability through the aversion of “ a serious disturbance in the economy of Member States.”13 Its 
realisation  of  the  need  to  implement  this  provision  occurred  after  Lehman  Brothers  filed  for 
bankruptcy – the first case to be decided under Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty being Bradford and 
Bingley.
In respect of Northern Rock, and with respect to the legal basis of the Commission’s decisions, “the 
rescue decision and the decision of 2 April 2008 to open the formal investigation procedure, were 
taken on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty and the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines - 
the reason for this being that the Commission considered the difficulties faced by Northern Rock to 
be linked specifically to Northern Rock – therefore not justifying the application of Article 87(3)(b) 
of the Treaty.
As the severity of  the Financial  Crisis  affected more and more banks,  in  September  2008, the 
Commission considered the application of Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty, to banks that were in receipt 
of State aid, to be necessary thereafter. As a result, the decision extending the formal investigation 
procedure and ii) the final decision, were taken on the basis of Article 87 (3)(b) EC Treaty.14
9A van Aaken and J Kurtz, „Prudence or Discrimination? Emergency Measures, The Global Financial Crisis and 
International Economic Law“ Journal of International Economic Law 12(4) at page 862. 
Aaken and Kurtz also elaborate on „how certain aspects of international economic law might act as a credible 
constraint on state tendencies toward domestic preference when formalizing emergency responses to the crisis.“ see also 
ibid at page 859.
10 Which establishes that „ (save as otherwise provided in the Treaties), any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form (whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings  or  the  production  of  certain  goods)  shall,  in  so  far  as  it  affects  trade  between  Member  States,  be 
incompatible with the Internal Market.”
11 For further information on the definition of State aid see Rodriguez – Miguez J and Ojo M, “Juridical and 
Financial Considerations on the Public Re Capitalisation and Rescue of Financial Institutions During Periods of 
Financial Crisis”, particularly, pages 12 –15 of 74.
12 See D Gerard, „Managing the Financial Crisis in Europe: Why Competition Law is Part of the Solution, Not of 
the Problem” Global Competition Review December 2008 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1330326> at page 6 
13 See also M Ojo, “Social rights and economic objectives: The importance of competition at supra national 
level” <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24265/>
14 See Z Didziokaite and M Gort, „Restructuring in the Banking Sector During the Financial Crisis: The Northern 
Rock Case” at pages 3 and 4 of 6 ; also see ibid.
Guarantee schemes could be distinguished from recapitalisation schemes in that  recapitalisation 
schemes  are  generally  used  in  collaboration  with  financial  institutions  that  are  “fundamentally 
sound but which may experience  distress because of extreme conditions in financial markets.”15 
However, the Recapitalisation Communication also makes provision for banks which are not so 
fundamentally sound.16
The objective being the provision of public funds in order “to consolidate the capital base of the 
financial institutions directly or to facilitate the injection of private capital by other means, so as to 
prevent negative systemic spill overs.”17
Under section 2 paragraph 14 of the Banking Communication, distortions of competition resulting 
from schemes supporting the viability of institutions which are illiquid but otherwise fundamentally 
sound, will normally be more limited and require less substantial restructuring than those financial 
institutions which are particularly affected by losses stemming for instance from inefficiencies, poor 
asset-liability management or risky strategies. In the paper preceding this,18 the justification for the 
grant  of  State  aid  to  institutions  whose  losses  result  from  inefficiencies,  poor  asset-liability 
management  or  risky  strategies  was  considered.  Furthermore,  the  grant  of  State  aid  to  such 
institutions  was  justified  on  the  basis  that  systemic  relevant  institutions  within  this  category19, 
whose failure pose such disastrous consequences for financial stability, should not be allowed to 
fail. 
With respect to purposes which the recapitalisation of banks could serve, three common objectives 
are listed in the Commission’s Communication 20 and these are as follows:
- Contribution  to  the  restoration  of  financial  stability  as  well  as  the  restoration  of  the 
confidence needed for the recovery of inter-bank lending. Further, additional capital serves 
as a cushion during periods of recession by absorbing losses and reducing the likelihood and 
risk of banks becoming insolvent.21
- Facilitating lending to the real economy22
15 Recapitalisation schemes constitute a “second systemic measure in response to the recent financial crisis to be used to 
support  financial  institutions  that  are fundamentally sound but  which  may experience distress  because  of  extreme 
conditions in financial markets.” See Banking Communication Section 4 paragraph 34 of the “Communication from the 
Commission — The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of 
the current global financial crisis” (2008/C 270/02) at page 5
16See Section 2.3 paragraph 43 of the Communication from the Commission — The recapitalisation of financial institutions 
in  the  current  financial  crisis:  limitation  of  aid  to  the  minimum necessary  and  safeguards  against  undue  distortions  of 
competition - which states that the recapitalisation of banks which are not fundamentally sound should be subject to 
stricter requirements. Furthermore, paragraph 44 states that 
“As far as remuneration is concerned, it should in principle reflect the risk profile of the beneficiary and be higher 
than for fundamentally sound banks. This is without prejudice to the possibility for supervisory authorities to take urgent 
action where necessary in cases of restructuring.”
17 See section 4 paragraph 34 of the Banking Communication
18M Ojo, “Liquidity Assistance and the Provision of State Aid to Financial Institutions” (2010) Munich RePEc and 
SSRN Working Papers
19 Category of institutions whose losses result from inefficiencies, poor asset-liability management or risky strategies.
20 See paragraph 4 of the Communication from the Commission  —  The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the 
current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition
21 ibid
22 “Fundamentally sound banks may prefer to restrict lending in order to avoid risk and maintain higher capital ratios. 
State capital injection may prevent credit supply restrictions and limit the pass-on of the financial markets' difficulties to 
other businesses.” see ibid at paragraph 5. Further, according to paragraph 39 of the Recapitalsation Communication, 
“When Member States use recapitalisation with the objective of financing the real economy, they have to ensure that the aid 
effectively contributes to this. To that end, in accordance with national regulation, they should attach effective and enforceable 
national safeguards to recapitalisation which ensure that the injected capital is used to sustain lending to the real economy.”
- State recapitalisation could also serve to address and rectify insolvency problems faced by 
financial institutions – such problems having arisen as a result of such institutions’ particular 
business model or investment strategy.23
In  respect  of  this  third  objective  (for  which  the  recapitalisation  of  banks  could  serve),  it  is 
interesting to note that Paragraph 6 of the Recapitalisation Communication, provides for “problems 
of  financial  institutions  facing  insolvency  as  a  result  of  their  particular  business  model  or 
investment strategy“ - given the fact that paragraphs 4 and 5 explicitly provide for fundamentally 
sound financial institutions. Whilst paragraph 4 interalia  states that „additional capital provides a 
cushion in recessionary times to absorb losses and limits the risk of banks becoming insolvent“, 
paragraph 5 recognises that fundamentally sound banks may prefer to restrict lending in order to 
avoid risk and maintain higher capital ratios.
According to paragraph 6 of the Recapitalisation Communication, „a capital injection from public 
sources  providing emergency support  to  an individual  bank may also help to  avoid short  term 
systemic effects of its possible insolvency. In the longer term, recapitalisation could support efforts 
to prepare the return of the bank in question to long term viability or its  orderly winding-up.“ 
Against the back drop of this exceptional provision, a case relating to the grant of capital injections 
for a non fundamentally sound financial institution will be considered.
Hypo Real Estate (HRE) – Capital Injections
„In  April  2010,  the  German  Financial  Markets  Stabilisation  Fund  (SoFFin)  approved  the  next 
recapitalisation tranches of up to €1.85 billion for Hypo Real Estate Holding AG (HRE), within the 
framework of the existing capital plan. It is planned that this capital be paid into HRE's capital 
reserve in at least two tranches as necessary. In particular, the recapitalisation is necessary in order 
for DEPFA BANK plc to maintain its minimum regulatory capital ratios in the near future. The 
capital measure is subject to approval by the European Commission. Including the support measure 
at hand, SoFFin has to date, provided total recapitalisation support of around € 7.85 billion to the 
HRE Group.“24
Having regards  to  i)  Article  87(3)(b)  EC Treaty which  enables  the Commission to  declare  aid 
compatible with the Common Market if it is "to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a 
Member State"; the fact that ii) Germany considered HRE to be a bank with systemic relevance for 
the financial market, iii) BaFin confirmed that the own capital of the bank would fall short of the 
regulatory requirements if the bank did not receive further capital and iv) that bank supervisory 
procedures would be initiated if the bank did not receive further capital, the Commission assessed 
the State aid measures for HRE under Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty.25
23 Furthermore recapitalisation may also respectively serve to address short term and long term systemic effects through 
capital injections from public sources providing emergency support to an individual bank and  “supporting efforts to 
prepare the return of the bank in question to long term viability or its orderly winding-up.“ see ibid at paragraph 6
24See  „SoFFin  passes  resolution  on  €  1.85  billion  recapitalisation  for  HRE“  30  April  2010 
<http://www.hyporealestate.com/eng/pdf/1004recaptranch_e.pdf> „In 2007, HRE took over the Dublin-based DEPFA 
Bank plc and extended its business to public sector and infrastructure finance. HRE currently consists of the following 
main companies: Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG and DEPFA Bank plc.“ see European 
Commission, „State Aids n° C 15/2009 (ex N 196/2009), N 333/2009 & N 557/2009 – Germany Hypo Real Estate – 
Extension of Formal Investigation Procedure, and Temporary Find Capital Injections Compatible“ at paragraphs 12 and 
13
25See European Commission, „State Aids n° C 15/2009 (ex N 196/2009), N 333/2009 & N 557/2009 – Germany Hypo 
Real  Estate  –  Extension  of  Formal  Investigation  Procedure,  and  Temporary  Find  Capital  Injections  Compatible“ 
paragraphs 41 and 42, at pages 6 and 7; „The Commission re iterated is doubts on the viability of HRE in its decision 
(Decision C(2009) 5888 final) of 24 July 2009 and the present case, taking into account the more detailed figures in the 
„The Commission decided to assess the temporary compatibility of capital measures until a decision 
on the restructuring plan was taken - since Germany had asked for temporary approval of the capital 
measures.  If  the  measures  were  held  to  be  compatible  the  Commission  decided  it  would  not 
consider whether the measures were already compatible under the German rescue aid scheme.“26
Even  though  HRE was  in  the  process  of  restructuring  at  the  time,  and  Germany had  already 
provided  a  restructuring  plan  which  was  subsequently  updated  and was  being  assessed  by the 
Commission at the time, the need to temporarily grant emergency aid prior to the final assessment 
of the revised restructuring plan was acknowledged since financial  stability was at  stake in the 
prevailing case and urgent remedial action was required to keep the ailing bank afloat – this also 
being confirmed by the national financial supervisory authority.27
 In its decision, the Commission decided to temporarily find compatible with the Common Market
the capital injection amounting to EUR 60 million carried out in March 200928, the capital injection 
amounting to EUR 2 959 632 240 carried out in June 2009, and the capital injection amounting to 
EUR 3.0 billion to be carried out in November 2009 in favour of HRE until the Commission has 
taken a final decision on the restructuring plan.29 Furthermore the Commission concluded that the 
capital injections „are appropriate, necessary and proportional, and can be considered compatible 
with the Common Market on a temporary basis until a final decision was taken on the restructuring 
plan of HRE.“30
Such a decision to accord priority to financial stability will be contrasted to other scenarios which 
give more preference to  the need to minimise and avoid distortions of competition in  the next 
section.
updated restructuring plan and questioning whether the intended restructuring was sufficient to allow restoration of 
long-term viability on the basis of the State aid received and planned.
The Commission also identified three problematic aspects that  could affect  the long-term sustainability of 
HRE's business model – which it intended to investigate further. The three problematic aspects included:i) Funding, 
ii)Short- and long-term profitability and (iii)the fact that HREindicated in its revised business plan that it wanted to 
remain active in two fields: Commercial Real Estate and Public Finance. Nevertheless, the Commission observed at the 
time that the intended margin in the area of public finance was very low and that market pressure could further reduce 
achievable margins.“ See paragraphs 58 -61;ibid
26See ibid at paragraph 44
27Ibid at paragraph 48
28„With regard to its silent participation of EUR 1 billion, SoFFin was to receive a profit-related coupon of 10 %. This 
level of remuneration was considered to be  in line with paragraph 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication, which 
stipulates  that  where  the  price  cannot  be  set  to  levels  that  correspond  to  the  risk  profile  of  the  bank,  it  would 
nevertheless  need  to  be  close  to  that  required  for  a  similar  bank  under  normal  market  conditions.  Moreover,  the 
Commission highlighted the fact that HRE would not get capital at an economically justifiable remuneration level on 
the market in the current circumstances but that given the fact that HRE was in difficulty, it should pay at least a 
reasonable price - that 10 % was considered to be an acceptable level.“ (See Commission decision of 12 May 2009 in 
case N 615/2008, BayernLB); see paragraph 52; ibid.
29See ibid;section 5 at page 11; „The capital injection of EUR 60 million had only limited scope, resulting in a 8.65% 
share of HRE's equity capital which did not give Germany a major influence on the bank“; see paragraph 49
30Ibid at paragraph 54 
C. Minimising and Avoiding Distortions of Competition
I. Safeguards Against Possible Distortions of Competition in Recapitalisation Schemes.31
As well as highlighting the Banking Communication's emphasis on the need for safeguards aimed at 
preventing and limiting possible distortions of competition in recapitalisation schemes,32 paragraph 
35 of the Recapitalisation Communication also makes mention of the Banking Communication's 
requirement33 that  capital  injections  be limited to the minimum necessary and not  to  allow the 
beneficiary to engage in aggressive commercial strategies which would be incompatible with the 
underlying objectives of recapitalisation. Where higher remuneration is required by the State, there 
will  (as  a  general  principle)  be  less  need  for  safeguards  -  since  the  level  of  price,  in  the 
Commission’s view, will limit distortions of competition.34 
However this can be contrasted with the case involving Hypo Real Estate where in respect of the 
capital  injections  carried out  by acquiring  share  capital  and the injection into  the reserves,  the 
German authorities highlighted that SoFFin as 100% HRE owner, was entitled to a shareholder's 
usual  remuneration. Furthermore,  it  was  stated  that  „for  a  distressed bank,  no  market-conform 
remuneration can be expected, at least in the short-term, for such provision of capital and that in 
line with the Recapitalisation Communication, such a situation required a thorough and far-reaching 
restructuring.“35
Safeguards  which  have  been  proposed  as  means  of  preventing  distortions  of  competition  with 
guarantee schemes include restrictions on commercial conducts through for example market share 
ceilings,  limitations  to  the  size  of  the  balance-sheet  of  the  beneficiary  institutions  or  other 
behavioural constraints that may be needed to achieve the purpose of the guarantee.36 Issues which 
are also considered to arise with these safeguards include:37
1) How they can be properly monitored and enforced since financial services are typically not 
regarded as standardized products.
2) The  likelihood  that  some restrictions  such  as  those  on  the  growth  of  undertaking  may 
themselves generate anticompetitive effects in terms of collusive agreements.
31In the Commission's view, „Safeguards may be necessary to prevent aggressive commercial expansion financed by State 
aid. In principle, mergers and acquisitions can constitute a valuable contribution to the consolidation of the banking industry 
with a view to achieving the objectives of stabilising financial  markets  and ensuring a steady flow of credit  to the real  
economy. In order not to privilege those institutions with public support to the detriment of competitors without such support, 
mergers and acquisitions should generally be organised on the basis of a competitive tendering process.” see paragraph 37 of 
the Recapitalisation Communication.
32Paragraph 35 of the Banking Communication
33Paragraph 38 of the Banking Communication
34„Banks receiving State recapitalisation should also avoid advertising it for commercial purposes.” See paragraph 36 of the 
Recapitalisation Communication. (Communication from the Commission  — The recapitalisation of financial institutions in 
the  current  financial  crisis:  limitation  of  aid  to  the  minimum  necessary  and  safeguards  against  undue  distortions  of 
competition )
35See paragraph 53 of European Commission, „State Aids n° C 15/2009 (ex N 196/2009), N 333/2009 & N 557/2009 – 
Germany Hypo Real Estate – Extension of Formal Investigation Procedure, and Temporary Find Capital Injections 
Compatible“
36Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” Organisation for 
Economic  Cooperation and Development  Publications  February 2009 at  page  15.Paper  served  as  the  basis  for  a  
discussion on the financial crisis in the OECD Competition Committee on 17-18 February 2009 and  is published  
under the responsibility of the Secretary General of the OECD. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/24/42538399.pdf>
37ibid
3) Of paramount importance is the concern related to the remuneration of the guarantee scheme 
or any other form of intervention such as the recapitalization schemes. 38
II. Prevention and Limitation of Undue Distortions of Competition
Three  levels  of  possible  distortions  of  competition  are  highlighted  in  the  Commission 
Communication39 on the Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions and these are as follows:40
− First, recapitalisation by one Member State of its own banks should not give those banks an 
undue  competitive  advantage  over  banks  in  other  Member  States.  Access  to  capital  at 
considerably lower rates than competitors from other Member States, in the absence of an 
appropriate  risk-based  justification,  may  have  a  substantial  impact  on  the  competitive 
position of a bank in the wider single European market.41
− Secondly,  recapitalisation  schemes  which  are  open to  all  banks  within  a  Member  State 
without  an  appropriate  degree  of  differentiation between beneficiary banks  according  to 
their  risk  profiles  may give  an  undue advantage  to  distressed  or  less-performing banks 
compared to banks which are fundamentally sound and better-performing.42
− Thirdly, public recapitalisation, in particular its remuneration, should not have the effect of 
putting banks that do not have recourse to public funding, but seek additional capital on the 
market, in a significantly less competitive position.43
In considering whether State aid (and in particular emergency guarantees) was to be granted to 
Hypo Real Estate, the Commission in attempting to ensure that  distortions of competition were 
minimised (as far as possible), considered the Requirement that aid granted “does not exceed what 
is strictly necessary to achieve its legitimate purpose and that distortions of competition are avoided 
or minimized as far as possible” - in line with the general principles which constitute the basis of 
State aid rules of the Treaty, which require that the aid granted “does not exceed what is strictly 
38„In principle, the remuneration of any type of support such as the issuance of new shares or asset swaps should be 
determined on the basis of a market-oriented valuation and be as close as possible to the market rate. However, at the 
current moment, the pricing mechanism in the markets seems to have stopped working properly. In such a situation, an 
important question is how to explicitly calculate an appropriate remuneration for the public supports in a time when 
markets are so highly illiquid and volatile that market prices may no longer be tied to the value of fundamentals. This 
issue resembles the current de”bate in the application of mark-to-market accounting  standards when markets do not 
work properly.” ibid
39 See paragraphs 7-10 of the Communication from the Commission – „The recapitalisation of Financial Institutions in 
the  Current Financial Crisis: Limitation of aid to the Minimum Necessary and Safeguards Against  Undue Distortions of 
Competition
40See paragraphs 8 -10; ibid
41„ Excessive aid in one Member State could also prompt a subsidy race among Member States and create difficulties for the 
economies of Member States which have not introduced recapitalisation schemes. A coherent and coordinated approach to the 
remuneration of public capital  injections, and to  the other conditions attached to  recapitalisation, is  indispensable to the 
preservation of a level playing field. Unilateral and uncoordinated action in this area may also undermine efforts to restore 
financial stability (‘Ensuring fair competition between Member States’).”
42„ This  will  distort  competition  on  the  market,  distort  incentives,  increase  moral  hazard  and  weaken  the  overall 
competitiveness of European banks (‘Ensuring fair competition between banks’).”
43“A public  scheme  which  crowds  out  market-based  operations  will  frustrate  the  return  to  normal  market  functioning 
(‘Ensuring a return to normal market functioning’).”
necessary  to  achieve  its  legitimate  purpose  and  that  distortions  of  competition  are  avoided  or 
minimized as far as possible.”44
III. Exit Strategies to Address Distortions to Competition Instituted by Crisis Responses 
According  to  the  Recapitalisation  Communication,  „recapitalisation  measures  need  to  contain 
appropriate incentives for State capital to be redeemed when the market so allows. The simplest 
way to provide an incentive for banks to look for alternative capital is for Member States to require 
an adequately high remuneration for the State recapitalisation.“45
Furthermore, the Communication states that „if a Member State prefers not to increase the nominal 
rate of remuneration, it may consider increasing the global remuneration through call options or 
other redemption clauses,  or mechanisms that encourage private capital  raising,  for instance by 
linking the payment of dividends to an obligatory remuneration of the State which increases over 
time.“46
In facilitating exit strategies, „member States may also consider using a restrictive dividend policy 
to ensure the temporary character of State intervention.“47
The  OECD's  proposal  is  founded  on  the  distinction  between  the  types  of  aid  provided  for  i) 
financial firms for systemic reasons and ii) for non-financial firms with structural problems. As pre 
requisite for the grant of aid to non financial firms, the requirement that “ structural reforms to a 
sustainable industry structure” exist, was put forward.48
Furthermore, “the need to ensure that structural reforms promote the long-term viability of these 
firms” is considered to constitute part of an exit strategy.49 Other forms of aid considered include:50
• nationalization of financial institutions or non-financial firms;
• state-sponsored capital injections51 
• extended liquidity facilities;
• interbank lending guarantees; and
• state acquisition of so-called “toxic assets”.
44European Commission, “European Commission  State aid n° N 694/2009 – Germany Emergency guarantees for Hypo 
Real Estate” 
45See paragraph 31
46See paragraph 32 of the Recapitalisation Communication.
47See paragraph 32 of the Recapitalisation Communication 
48See Organisation for Economic Co operation Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at page 22
49ibid
50ibid
51„In the European Union, relevant competition decisions have included Commission Decision of 13 October 2008 in 
Case  N  507/08  Financial  Support  Measures  to  the  banking  Industry  in  the  UK  (OJ  C  290,  13.11.2008,  p.  4), 
Commission Decision of 27 October 2008 in Case N 512/08 Support measures for financial institutions in Germany (OJ 
C 293, 15.11.2008, p. 2) and Commission Decision of 19 November 2008 in Case N 560/08 Support measures for the  
credit institutions in Greece, Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 in Case N 528/08 the Netherlands,  Aid to 
ING Groep N.V., Commission Decision of 25 November 2008 in Case NN 68/08 on Latvian State support to JSC Parex 
Banka. Commission Communication of 13 October on The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to 
financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis (OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p.8) and European 
Commission principles are outlined in Commission Communication of 5 December on The recapitalization of financial 
institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue 
distortion of competition (OJ C 10, 15.1.2009 p.2).” see OECD, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at page 22
IV. Recapitalisation  Schemes  in  Respect  of  Non  Fundamentally  Sound  Institutions  and  the 
Grant of State Capital: The Objective of Fostering Competition Overriding the Need to Promote 
Financial Stability?
Why should  financial  institutions  whose  problems  are  attributable  to  inefficiencies,  poor  asset 
liability management or risky strategies not be accorded the same treatment as those whose viability 
problems are exogenously induced (and also related to extreme conditions which prevail  in the 
financial  market)  as  far  as  such  “non  fundamentally  sound”  institutions  are  considered  to  be 
systemically relevant?
Section 2.3 paragraphs  43 and 44 of  the Recapitalisation Communication highlights  safeguards 
which are available where the grant of State capital to non fundamentally sound institutions are 
approved. Banks which would require more far reaching restructuring and which are considered not 
to be fundamentally sound are subject to more stringent requirements than fundamentally sound 
financial institutions (which would require less restructuring). Such stringent requirements include:
− The  requirement  that  remuneration  should  “in  principle  reflect  the  risk  profile  of  the 
beneficiary  and  be  higher  (for  non fundamentally  sound  banks)  than  for  fundamentally 
sound banks - without prejudice to the possibility for supervisory authorities to take urgent 
action where necessary in cases of restructuring.”52
− The acceptability and approval of use of State capital for  non fundamentally sound banks 
being dependent  on the  condition of  either  a  bank's  winding-up or  a  thorough and far-
reaching restructuring, including a change in management and corporate governance where 
appropriate. 53
The Commission in its Communication explicitly states that  „Notwithstanding the need to ensure 
financial  stability,  the  use  of  State  capital  for  these  banks  (non fundamentally  sound financial 
institutions) can only be accepted on the condition of either a bank's winding-up or a thorough and 
far-reaching  restructuring,  including  a  change in  management  and corporate  governance  where 
appropriate.“54
Does this infer that the Commission is prepared to override the paramount objective of financial 
stability  –  by  according  greater  prominence  to  the  goal  of  fostering  competition?  This  might 
initially appear  to  be the case.  As highlighted in  the second section of its  predecessor  paper55, 
financial  institutions  whose  problems  are  attributed  to  “inefficiencies,  poor  asset-liability 
management  or  risky strategies”  and  which  are  considered  to  be  systemically  relevant,  should 
benefit  from state aid where restructuring of such institutions occur – to  the extent that  senior 
52See paragraph 44 which furthermore adds that “Where the price cannot be set to levels that correspond to the risk profile 
of the bank, it would nevertheless need to be close to that required for a similar bank under normal market conditions. “
53“As a result, either a comprehensive restructuring plan or a liquidation plan will have to be presented for these banks within 
six months of recapitalisation. As indicated in the Banking Communication, such a plan will be assessed according to the 
principles of the rescue and and restructuring guidelines for firms in difficulties,  and will have to include compensatory 
measures.”
54See paragraph 44 of the Recapitalisation Communication. (Communication from the Commission — The recapitalisation of 
financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue 
distortions of competition )
55See M Ojo, “Liquidity Assistance and the Provision of State Aid to Financial Institutions” (2010) Munich RePEc and 
SSRN Working Papers
management (or indeed the entire management) of those institutions are replaced.
Such  intentional  safeguard  by the  Commission  whilst  ensuring  that  competition  is  not  unduly 
distorted, also serves as a warning to “too big to fail firms” that guaranteed government or central 
bank intervention in the case of impending financial difficulties does not serve as an excuse for 
complacency or reckless risk taking behaviour. Such a move by the Commission is therefore aimed 
at deterring moral hazard whilst fostering competition.
D. The Increased Prominence of the Role Assumed by Central Banks – The Impact of the 
Recent Financial Crisis.
I. Traditional Roles of Central Banks
1) Lender of Last Resort Arrangements56
The need for the creation of bridge banks and a Special Resolution Regime (SRR) was brought to 
light following numerous related proposals which were put forward following the financial woes of 
banks such as Northern Rock and Hypo Real Estate.57
One of the weaknesses of central banks which was revealed during the Financial Crisis was the 
inability of the Bank of England to perform its traditional role as lender of last resort for a limited 
period of time (without such a role being made public) – which created problems that triggered the 
run on Northern Rock.
Unconventional measures which were introduced by advanced economies in response to the latter 
stages of 2008 include liquidity provision to banks on extra ordinary terms – particularly for longer 
periods of maturity and intervention in selected credit markets.58
2)Oversight of payment systems
Furthermore,  as  observed by Hannoun59,  central  banks  are  increasingly being  put  in  charge  of 
overseeing systemic risk. Such an innovative role can be considered to be an extension of their 
traditional role as overseers of payment systems. Hannoun goes on to attribute the delegation of 
such responsibility for the oversight of systemic risk as owing to their unique positions as ultimate 
providers of liquidity – which places them in a such a formidable stance to focus on system wide 
risks (as well as obtaining an integrated view of both the individual financial institutions and the 
financial system as a whole).60
56 For more information on the role of the lender of last resort, see RM Lastra, and A Campbell, ‘Revisiting the 
Lender of Last Resort. The Role of the Bank of England’, book chapter (Ch. 10) in The Future of Financial Regulation, 
edited by Iain G MacNeil and Justin O'Brien, Hart Publishing 2010, pp. 161-178.
57 For further information on bridge banks and means whereby ailing banks could efficiently be relieved of their assets, 
see D Schäfer and KF Zimmerman, “Bad Bank (s) and Re capitalization of the Banking Sector” (2009) Discussion 
Paper 897 of DIW Berlin <http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3656>
58 “Such a measure being aimed at supporting secondary market liquidity and the outright purchase of bonds”. See H 
Hannoun, “The Expanding Role of Central Banks Since the Crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010 Bank for 
International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 3
59 see ibid
60 ibid
In addition to  their  unique position as  ultimate providers of  liquidity,  the extensive knowledge 
possessed  by  central  banks  –  such  knowledge  and  expertise  being  attributed  to  their  role  as 
overseers of payment systems, their means of acquiring such knowledge and expertise, places them 
in a formidable position in matters relating to the responsibility for macro prudential supervision.
Two examples have been put forward to bolster the argument that “the macro prudential approach to 
supervision should take into consideration the fact that, even when financial institutions appear to 
be  strong  on  an  individual  basis,  systemic  risk  could  still  emerge  as  a  result  of  the 
interconnectedness of financial institutions, markets and infrastructures” - such examples being the 
creation  of  the  European  Systemic  Risk  Board  (ESRB)  and  the  proposed  Financial  Stability 
Oversight Council in the United States.61 
The Role of Central Banks in Managing Liquidity62 Risks 
As well as highlighting the need to address the question on how much maturity transformation is 
needed – in matters relating to maturity transformation and liquidity risks, it is argued that “maturity 
transformation is one of those areas which we rely on the banking system to perform and that since 
there may never be enough short-term liabilities issued by governments and the private sector (to 
satisfy the demand for liquid short-term savings instruments), that the primary function of banks in 
providing these vehicles to the public, should be welcomed.”63
The likelihood that banks are exposed to significant levels of liquidity risks arises from the nature 
of  commercial  banks’ business,  namely,  the fact  that  such business  involves,  to  a  fundamental 
extent, maturity transformation.
The provision of central bank reserves account serves as a means whereby commercial banks are 
able to manage their liquidity risk – through a process which enables them to meet their “ordinary 
payment needs – including normal intra day variations.”64
Over the recent years, it has increasingly been acknowledged that macro prudential policies are not 
only considered to be “a missing ingredient from the current policy framework”, but that there has 
also been “too huge a gap between macro economic policy and the regulation of individual financial 
institutions.”65
According to recent observations, some aspects of the more prominent role which central banks 
have assumed since the recent Crisis (such a role being partly attributed to circumstances triggered 
61 ibid
62 “Liquidity is the ability of a bank to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without incurring 
unacceptable  losses.”  See  Basel  Committee  on  Banking   Supervision,  “Principles  for  Sound  Liquidity  Risk 
Management and Supervision” < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.pdf>
63 See S Cecchetti, „Financial Reform: A Progress Report“ Remarks prepared for the Westminster Economic Forum, 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research, October 2010 at page 4 of 6 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101004.htm
64 Maturity transformation is evident within the banking system and day to day business operations since “customer 
deposits  may be available for  instant  withdrawals  while  bank  lending to  corporations  and  households  tends to  be 
committed,  potentially for  many years.”  See P Fisher,  „Managing Liquidity in  the System – the Bank’s  Liquidity 
Insurance Operations“ at page 2 <http://www.bis.org/review/r101004e.pdf>
65 Please also refer to abstract;  See Bank of England, Executive Summary “Role of Macro Prudential Policy” 
Discussion Paper November 2009  at page 3 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/financialstability/roleofmacroprudentialpolicy091121.pdf
by the recent financial Crisis), are likely to become more permanent during the aftermath of the 
Crisis.66 Unconventional measures which were introduced by advanced economies in response to the 
latter stages of 2008 include liquidity provision to banks on extra ordinary terms – particularly for 
longer periods of maturity, intervention in selected credit markets – a measure aimed at supporting 
secondary market liquidity and the outright purchase of bonds – such purchase being aimed at 
improving financing conditions beyond that which can be achieved by policy rate cuts.67
Tools implemented by the Federal Reserve Board, in its response to the recent Crisis, have been 
classified into three:68
− The first set of tools, which are closely tied to the central bank's traditional role as the lender 
of  last  resort,  which  involve  the  provision  of  short-term  liquidity  to  banks  and  other 
depository institutions and other financial institutions.69 
− A second set of tools, which involve the provision of liquidity directly to borrowers and 
investors in key credit markets.70
− A third set of instruments, through which the Federal Reserve has expanded its traditional 
tool of open market  operations to support  the functioning of credit  markets  through the 
purchase of longer-term securities for the Federal Reserve's portfolio.“
In addition to the reduction of the federal funds rate, Kohn provides a list of actions which have 
been taken by the Federal Reserve to ease conditions in credit markets more directly (referred to as 
"credit easing").71 He regards such actions as „extensions of traditional methods of operation which 
have resulted in a new territory in which tools have been implemented in very new ways.“72 
He  elaborates  further  on  the  measures  which  have  been  taken  by  the  Fed  Reserve  through  a 
flashback to the start of the Financial Crisis when:73
− The terms on which lending was provided to depository institutions (traditional borrowers) 
were eased quite dramatically. This was followed by the lowering of interest rate on discount 
window loans, an increase in their maturity, and, auctioned credit (aimed at reducing the 
stigma of borrowing from the window). Cooperative measures with foreign central banks 
through currency swaps (to make dollar funding available to banks operating abroad) also 
took place.
He then recounts how, for the first time since the 1930s, credit was extended to non depository 
institutions – as well as the grant of discount window access to primary dealers when it became 
evident  that  constraints  on  their  access  to  liquidity  threatened  broader  financial  stability  and 
economic activity.74
66 H Hannoun  “The Expanding Role of Central banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010  Bank for 
International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 1
67 ibid at page 3
68 See Federal Reserve Board „The Federal Reserve Board's Response to the Crisis“ 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm>
69„The traditional discount window, Term Auction Facility, PDCF, and TSLF are classified into this category.“ ibid
70„The CPFF, AMLF, MMIFF, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) are classified into this 
category. „;ibid
71D Kohn, „Monetary Policy in the Financial Crisis“ Federal Reserve Board Publications April 2009 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20090418a.htm>
72Please refer to abstract
73See D Kohn, „Monetary Policy in the Financial Crisis“ Federal Reserve Board Publications April 2009 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20090418a.htm>
74He also provides an illustration in relation to last Autumn when „a run on money market mutual funds was severely 
constricting their purchases of commercial paper, an important source of credit to many businesses.“ In this respect he 
II. Macro Prudential Supervision and Basel III
Under its macro prudential overlay and its efforts to address stability over time (pro cyclicality), one 
of  those  initiatives  highlighted  under  the  Basel  III  framework includes  counter  cyclical  capital 
charges and forward looking provisioning.
Progress made with Counter Cyclical Measures in Various Jurisdictions
According to Brunnermeier et al, counter cyclical measures should be applied on a country specific 
basis since cycles are not identical across several jurisdictions around the world.75 In their opinion, 
it is yet too early to talk about a “global cycle” since “credit expansion has taken place at a very 
different pace in various countries.”76 As observed by Caprio Jr, even though77 no country thus far 
had adopted a counter cyclical capital requirement policy, as recommended by Brunnermeier et al, a 
few have adopted counter cyclical provisioning – Spain being the first to implement such, followed 
by Colombia and much more recently, Peru.78
Measures aimed at “building up reserves over the cycle which might be part of regulatory capital or 
separate from it and which would amount to 2 – 3 % of risk weighted assets at the peak of a boom” 
have been proposed in the UK by its financial services regulator, the Financial Services Authority.79 
Other measures of counter cyclical regulation which are being considered by other jurisdictions 
(and which would “limit the scope under Basel 2 arrangements for banks to assess their own risk by 
providing a one-size fits all ceiling and may be beneficial in making regulation more transparent)80 
could include “an overall leverage ratio of capital to unadjusted assets (rather than risk weighted 
assets).”81
Dynamic Provisioning
Whilst the principles of the Spanish Dynamic Provision Mechanism are lauded by Brunnermeier et 
al, its “quantitative effect” is not considered by them to have had a moderate effect on the credit 
cycle  –  to  the  same extent  as  their  proposed  mechanism.  Its  universal  adoption82,  is  however, 
considered to represent a “ counter- cyclical- lite” in the case where their proposal (Brunnermeier et 
adds that „the funds, their customers, and their borrowers were supported by making credit available – credit which 
allowed  funds  to  meet  heavy  redemption  requests  and  which  also  provided  credit  directly  to  borrowers  in  the 
commercial paper market.“ 
75 See M Brunnermeier et al, “The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation” Geneva Reports on the World 
Economy, 11< http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/Geneva11.pdf> at page 37 (page 55 of 98)
76 In this respect, they illustrate with the example that Germany and Italy did not share in the housing cycle that affected 
the USA, UK, Spain etc. See ibid
77 As of February 2010
78 See G Caprio Jr, “Safe and Sound Banking: A Role for Counter cyclical Regulatory Requirements” World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 5198, The World Bank Development Research Group, Finance and Private Sector 
Development Team, February 2010 at page 11
79 See E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote Address at the 6th 
Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European Union, 12th June 2009, entitled „Causes and 
Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis, What lessons for EU Countries?“ at page 10 and also Financial Services 
Authority, “The Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global banking Crisis” FSA Publications 2009
80 Although it is added that “it is essential that such ceiling applies to all relevant assets and does not encourage banks to 
use off-balance structures to evade such a ceiling” See E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential Regulation – The 
Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote Address at the 6th Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European 
Union, 12th June 2009, entitled „Causes and Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis, What lessons for EU 
Countries?“ at page 10
81 ibid
82 „Including the adjustment of IFRS to allow that to occur”
al’s proposal) is considered as being too radical.
III. Why Central Banks Assume Such a Crucial Role Given the Present Framework of Basel III
In  its  present  form,  Basel  III  accords  much  pre  eminence  to  the  need  for  macro  prudential 
supervision – as well as a macro prudential framework.
Central  banks,  it  is  argued,  have  a  key  role  to  play  in  establishing  such  a  macro  prudential 
framework – as well as a role in macro prudential supervision and regulation for the following 
reasons:83
Developing and structuring macro prudential measures requires reliable analytical and forecasting 
skills – for instance, with regard to the overall economy or specific market segments. Central banks 
have extensive and soundly based knowledge of these fields.
Macro prudential policy interacts closely with monetary policy – which implies that information 
advantage of central banks could be important in shaping macro prudential measures
We may then infer that central banks' crucial roles in establishing a macro prudential framework 
provide the key to bridging the gap between macro economic policy and the regulation of individual 
financial institutions. This however, on its own, is insufficient – close collaboration and effective 
information sharing between central banks and regulatory authorities is paramount. Principle 17 of 
the  Principles  for  Sound  Liquidity  Risk  Management  and  Supervision84 consolidates  on  this 
argument.
Principle 17 of the Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision85 elaborates 
on how cooperation and information sharing between relevant public authorities (including bank 
supervisors, central banks and securities regulators) can contribute significantly to the effectiveness 
of the roles assumed by these authorities.
Such communication will not only facilitate a process where:86
Supervisors are able to improve their assessments of the overall profile of a bank and the risks it 
faces (and help other authorities assess the risks presented to the broader financial system); but also
Assist supervisors in informing central banks of their judgement regarding the range of liquidity 
risks faced by firms (for which they are responsible) while central banks may help supervisors 
deepen their understanding of the current financial market environment and risks to the financial 
system as a whole
Central  banks’ knowledge  of  information  on  market  conditions  could  also  be  beneficial  for 
supervisors in their assessment of the “appropriateness of assumptions made by banks in stress test 
scenarios and contingency funding plans.”87 Furthermore, in their role as overseers of the payment 
83 TJ Jordan, „A Changing Role for Central Banks ?“ Speech by Mr Thomas J Jordan, Vice Chairman of the Governing 
Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Welcome Event Master of Banking and Finance, St. Gallen, 22 September 
2010, page 4
http://www.bis.org/review/r100924b.pdf
84 See Basel Committee on Banking  Supervision, “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision” 
paragraph 144, at page 34 < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.pdf>
85 ibid
86 see ibid at page 35
87 ibid
and settlement system, central banks are able to assist supervisors in “deepening their understanding 
of the linkages between institutions and the potential for disruptions to spread across the financial 
system.”88
In addition to the general practice undertaken by central banks - which involves the implementation 
of frequent “Financial Stability Reviews” which are aimed at evaluating the outlook for financial 
stability,  “the initial  policy objectives”  of  macro  prudential  regulation,  according  to  Davis  and 
Karim include the early identification of potential vulnerabilities and the encouragement of such 
financial institutions to undertake stress testing (this being facilitated through the public reporting 
which is carried out by financial institutions).89
IV. Re delineating Duties and Roles of Central Banks and Supervisory Agencies in Matters 
relating to Regulation and Supervision
As was highlighted in a previous paper,90 even though the aftermath of the recent Financial Crises is 
likely to witness the era of more prominent roles being transferred to central banks across several 
jurisdictions, a fundamental change and re-definition in roles and responsibilities between national 
supervisors and central banks is expected in the United Kingdom – as compared to jurisdictions 
such as Germany and the United States.91
The Banking Reform Act in the UK, not only provides the Bank of England with “ a legal objective 
to contribute to protecting and enhancing the stability of the financial systems of the UK but also 
formalises the Bank of England’s role in the supervision of payment systems.”92 The ability of the 
Bank  to  request  data  from banks  through  the  regulator,  the  FSA,  as  compared  to  the  present 
situation  where  the  FSA is  only able  to  collect  data  it  requires  itself,  is  considered  to  be “an 
important innovation”93 under the Act. These arrangements under the Act are also considered to be 
an important and vital means whereby the Bank is able to acquire “more detailed understanding of 
developments about the banking system.”94
„On 19 November 2009 the Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced the Financial Services Bill into 
Parliament.  The  Bill,  which  reforms  financial  services  regulation  and  contains  provisions  to 
improve redress for consumers, and financial education and awareness, received Royal Assent on 8 
April 2010. The Act includes:95
- A new statutory financial stability objective for the Financial Services Authority (FSA);
88 ibid
89 See E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote address at the 6th 
Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European Union, 12th June 2009, entitled “Causes and 
Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis, What Lessons for EU Countries?” see particularly pages 10 and 11 
http://www.euroframe.org/fileadmin/user_upload/euroframe/docs/2009/EUROF09_macroprudential_regulation.pdf
90 See J Rodriguez - Miguez and M Ojo, “Juridical and Financial Considerations on the Public Re Capitalisation and 
Rescue of Financial Institutions During Periods of Financial Crisis” <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1646320>
91 ibid
92 E P Davis and D Karim, “Macro Prudential Regulation – The Missing Policy Pillar” Keynote address at the 6th Euro 
frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European Union, 12th June 2009, entitled “Causes and 
Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis, What Lessons for EU Countries?” at page 12 
http://www.qass.org.uk/2009-July_Brunel-conference/Davis.pdf
93 See ibid
94 ibid
95HM Treasury, „Financial Services Act“ http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_bill_index.htm
- A new independent consumer financial education body, established by the FSA; 
- Provision for regulations on remuneration transparency, and a duty for the FSA to make rules on remuneration;
- A duty for the FSA to make rules requiring firms to produce recovery and resolution plans (also known as 
“living wills”); 
- Power for the FSA to ban short selling of certain instruments, and establish a permanent disclosure regime; and 
Greater disciplinary powers for the FSA, including earlier disclosure of investigations.“
The new statutory duty conferred on the UK’s financial services regulator (the FSA), namely, the 
new financial stability objective, is aimed at reinforcing the FSA’s international focus.96 Such an 
aim required not only “a consideration of the importance of re affirming the roles of the Treasury, 
Bank of England and the FSA, but also the need to establish mechanisms which would help ensure 
that  the tripartite authorities speak with a common voice in international fora.”97 Of paramount 
importance is the expectation that such a statutory duty would complement the Government and the 
Bank of England’s responsibility.98
Hence whilst, greater powers have been transferred to the Bank of England99, the FSA has also 
acquired a new statutory duty – in addition to the previous four statutory objectives.
Whilst the need for a greater role for central banks in facilitating financial stability and promoting 
systemic  oversight  is  a  positive  and justified  development,  the  growing intervention  of  central 
banks in financial markets gives rise to concerns. The recent Financial Crisis witnessed a series of 
rescues and restructuring of financial  institutions – such being facilitated by State aids – hence 
government  intervention.  Central  bank  intervention  provides  an  invaluable  source  of  liquidity 
funding in terms timeliness (particularly in view of urgent scenarios) when compared to State aids. 
The  promptness  of  central  banks  in  addressing  serious  liquidity  problems  faced  by  financial 
institutions has contributed to the realisation that its role in promoting financial stability should be 
accorded greater prominence. At the same time, it appears to be widely acknowledged that “the role 
of the lender of last resort facility should not be used to address individual bank insolvencies.”100
The “classic” view – under which it is held that “central banks should lend freely at a penalty rate as 
well as against good collateral”101 is considered to serve as a means of ensuring that :102
- 1) The lender of last resort is only used for illiquid banks 
- 2) In emergency situations
96 See HM Treasury, Reforming Financial Markets July 2009 at page 99
97 „“Whilst continuing to give adequate attention to regulatory debates” ibid
98 ibid
99 As well as responsibility for systemic oversight, the grant of further supplementary oversight functions to the Bank of 
England, it is further argued, will be desirable. For further information on this, see Shearman and Sterling LLP, “UK 
Government Proposals for Financial Regulatory Reform” June 2010 and Treasury Select Committee, “Banking Crisis: 
Regulation and Supervision_ Macro prudential Supervision” 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmtreasy/767/76707.htm
100 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at page 6 of 
28
101 „Another reason why central banks need to unwind their intervention in financial markets is that they are not immune 
to credit risk. The conventional rule is that central bank lending must be fully collateralised. Unsecured lending is a 
risky art, requiring discretion, which is incompatible with the principles of transparency and equal treatment in access to 
central bank credit. Nor is it consistent with the accountability of the central bank.” See H Hannoun  “The Expanding 
Role of Central banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010 Bank for International Settlements Publications 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 9
102 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at page 6 of 
28
A restricted application of the lender of last resort facility (as much as possible) is not only justified 
on the basis  that  moral  hazard could occur – since banks or financial  institutions  experiencing 
financial difficulty will almost always expect to be bailed out when such a need arises (and hence 
will be induced to take greater levels of risks than the case would have been if no such facility had 
existed). It is also argued that “the sustained bloating of their balance sheets means that central 
banks  still  dominate  some  financial  market  segments  thereby  distorting  the  pricing  of  some 
important  bonds  and  loans,  discouraging  necessary  market-making  by  private  individuals  and 
institutions.”103
V. Should lender of last resort arrangements be granted to a wider extent under complementary 
arrangements which support recapitalisation schemes than those which support guarantee schemes 
or vice versa?
Lender  of  last  resort  arrangements  should be granted to  illiquid systemically relevant  financial 
institutions in emergency situations.  This is partly attributed to the fact that Paragraph 6 of the 
Recapitalisation Communication, interestingly, provides for “problems of financial institutions
facing insolvency as a result of their particular business model or investment strategy.“
Other reasons why the lender of last resort facility should be used for emergency situations and 
systemically relevant institutions in particular,  are attributed to the role played by central  banks 
during the recent crisis – during which the role of central banks “in stepping in to replace disrupted 
and dislocated funding markets”104 was highlighted. In drawing attention to such developments, the 
need to avoid dependency on the central bank – to the extent that it does not become the “lender of 
first  resort”  (whenever  the  markets  reveal  signs  of  impeding  financial  failures),  is  also 
emphasised.105
Given the scale of government intervention and State rescues which occurred during the recent 
crisis –as well as the prominence accorded to measures aimed at preventing and limiting distortions 
of competition, calls have been made for competition authorities to take on more formidable roles in 
designing and implementing exit strategies. In order to foster competition as much as possible, it is 
proposed that ”governments should provide financial institutions with incentives to prevent them 
from depending on government support once the economy begins to recover.”106 Such incentives, it 
is further argued, could assume the form of rescue measures having conditions built into them – 
conditions  which  would  induce  financial  institutions  to  opt  for  private  sources  of  investments 
(rather than public sources of investment) when economic conditions return to normal.107
According to key findings published by the OECD, the design of competition policies in banking 
within several jurisdictions in Europe has undergone substantial reform at national level – with very 
103 H Hannoun  “The Expanding Role of Central banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010 Bank for 
International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 7
104 „During the crisis, central banks had to step in to replace disrupted and dislocated funding markets. Severe tensions 
in interbank, foreign exchange swap and some segments of securities markets – including, lately, government bond 
markets – hampered the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The usual relationship between key policy rates and 
the rates applicable in the real economy was disrupted, and the main tool for influencing financing conditions in the real 
economy did not work properly.” ibid
105 ibid at page 9
106 Organisation for Economic Co operation and Development, „ Competition and the Financial Markets” at page 10 
107 An example is provided where governments could make it un lucrative for beneficiaries to rely on public capital 
injections any longer than they have to – by imposing restrictions on them (restrictions such as escalating dividends or 
interest rates). At some point, it is further argued, private sources of equity will become more desirable; see ibid
unprecedented changes occurring over the last two decades.108 
The recent crisis has also witnessed unprecedented levels of intervention – in terms of government 
intervention. The OECD'S findings also highlight the fact that competition authorities around the 
world have also been compelled to participate in these actions for reasons other than those related to 
intense time pressure for action, - whilst questions relating to the application of competition policy 
to the financial sector have arisen.109 
Whilst the findings highlight the controversy generated by some who argue that competition rules 
should be suspended for the duration of the crisis - thus allowing regulators to focus only on the 
objective of safeguarding the stability of the financial system, it concludes that whether competition 
is  desirable  at  all  when  there  is  a  systemic  crisis,  is  a  matter  which  generally,  is  in  need  of 
clarification.110 
E. Conclusion
The rationale for central bank and government intervention through lender of last resort facilities 
and State rescues respectively, is justified where safeguards exist to ensure that such intervention 
does  not  induce  increased  levels  of  risk  taking  or  result  in  undue  distortions  of  competition. 
Through  its  provision  in  section  2.3  paragraph  44  of  the  Recapitalisation  Communication,  the 
European Commission has taken a huge step in its efforts to ensure that moral hazard is discouraged 
, undue distortions of competition minimised – whilst providing life lines to systemically relevant 
financial  institutions  whose  problems  are  attributed  to  “inefficiencies,  poor  asset-liability 
management or risky strategies”. Such life line is provided „on the condition of either a bank's 
winding-up or a thorough and far-reaching restructuring, including a change in management and 
corporate  governance  where  appropriate.“  In  drawing  a  distinction  between  “the  treatment  of 
illiquid but  otherwise fundamentally sound financial  institutions” (where  viability problems are 
exogenously induced and also related to extreme conditions which prevail in the financial market), 
and the treatment of financial institutions whose endogenous problems are related to inefficiency or 
excessive risk- taking, such a distinction is geared towards the objectives of:
1) Remedying a serious disturbance in the economy;
2)  Ensuring  that  measure  is  proportionate111 to  the  challenge  faced,  not  going  beyond  what  is 
required to attain this effect; and
3) designed in such a way as to minimize negative spill over effects on competitors, other sectors 
and other member states.”
108For example, in Italy since December 2005 competition policy in banking is no longer enforced by the Bank of Italy 
but rather by the competition authority as in all other sectors. In the Netherlands, the Competition Act of 1998 applies to 
the banking sector, but only since 2000. See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition 
and the Financial Crisis” at page 12
109ibid at page 13
110“Others have instead emphasised the importance of applying strict competition rules in the current crisis as a means 
of ensuring a level playing field and a coordinated reaction to the crisis – as well as avoiding a futile race for subsidies 
between countries to attract depositors and investors. Moreover, the long-term effects of relaxing competition policy can 
be serious. Mergers that lead to very concentrated markets in particular are almost impossible to reverse.”; ibid
111According to paragraph 38 of the Commission's Communication on Recapitalisation “The extent of behavioural safeguards 
should be based on a proportionality assessment, taking into account all relevant factors and in particular, the risk profile of 
the beneficiary bank. While banks with a very low risk profile may require only very limited behavioural safeguards, the need 
for such safeguards increases with a higher risk profile. The proportionality assessment is further influenced by the relative 
size of the capital injection by the State and the attained level of capital endowment.”
 -  in line with the general principles which constitute the basis of State aid rules of the Treaty 
(Article 87 EC Treaty and Article 107 TFEU (ex Article 87 EC Treaty).
REFERENCES
Bank of England, Executive Summary “Role of Macro Prudential Policy” Discussion Paper 
November 2009
Basel Committee on Banking  Supervision, “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision” < http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.pdf>
Brunnermeier M et al, “The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation” Geneva Reports on 
the World Economy, 11< http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/Geneva11.pdf
Caprio Jr, G “Safe and Sound Banking: A Role for Counter cyclical Regulatory Requirements” 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5198, The World Bank Development Research Group, 
Finance and Private Sector Development Team, February 2010
Cecchetti  S,  „Financial  Reform:  A Progress  Report“  Remarks  prepared  for  the  Westminster 
Economic Forum, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, October 2010
Davis  EP and  Karim D,  “Macro  Prudential  Regulation  –  The  Missing  Policy  Pillar”  Keynote 
Address at the 6th Euro frame Conference on Economic Policy Issues in the European Union, 12th 
June 2009, entitled „Causes and Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis, What lessons for EU 
Countries?“
European Commission,  „“State aid NN 44/2008 – Germany Rescue Aid for Hypo Real Estate” 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/NN-44-2008-WLWL-en-02.10.2008.pdf>
European Commission,  “Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid 
rules  to measures taken in relation to financial  institutions in the context  of the current  global 
financial crisis” (2008/C 270/02) 
European Commission, “Communication from the Commission — The recapitalisation of financial 
institutions in  the  current  financial  crisis:  limitation  of  aid  to  the  minimum  necessary  and 
safeguards against undue distortions of competition “
European Commission, Case N 507/08 Financial Support Measures to the banking Industry in the 
UK (OJ C 290, 13.11.2008, p. 4)
European  Commission,  Commission  Decision  of  27  October  2008  in  Case  N  512/08  Support 
measures for financial institutions in Germany (OJ C 293, 15.11.2008, p. 2)
European Commission, „State Aids n° C 15/2009 (ex N 196/2009), N 333/2009 & N 557/2009 – 
Germany Hypo Real Estate – Extension of Formal Investigation Procedure, and Temporary Find 
Capital Injections Compatible“ 
European Commission, Commission Decision of 19 November 2008 in Case N 560/08  Support 
measures for the credit institutions in Greece
European  Commission,  Commission  Decision  of  12  November  2008  in  Case  N  528/08  the 
Netherlands, Aid to ING Groep N.V.
European Commission, Commission Decision of 25 November 2008 in Case NN 68/08 on Latvian 
State support to JSC Parex Banka. 
Federal  Reserve Board „The Federal  Reserve Board's  Response to  the Crisis“  Federal  Reserve 
Publications 2010 <http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm>
Fisher P, „Managing Liquidity in the System – the Bank’s Liquidity Insurance Operations“ at page 
2 <http://www.bis.org/review/r101004e.pdf>
Hannoun H, “The Expanding Role of Central banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 
2010 Bank for International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1
Jordan TJ, „A Changing Role for Central Banks ?“ Speech by Mr Thomas J Jordan, Vice Chairman 
of the Governing Board of the Swiss National Bank, at the Welcome Event Master of Banking and 
Finance, St. Gallen, 22 September 2010.
Kohn D, „Monetary Policy in the Financial Crisis“ Federal Reserve Board Publications April 2009 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20090418a.htm>
Lastra  RM,  and Campbell  A,  ‘Revisiting  the  Lender  of  Last  Resort.  The  Role  of  the Bank of 
England’, book chapter (Ch. 10) in The Future of Financial Regulation, edited by Iain G MacNeil 
and Justin O'Brien, Hart Publishing 2010, pp. 161-178.
Lastra RM, and Garicano L, ‘Towards a new Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles’,
forthcoming in the Special Issue of the Journal of International Economic Law, Special Issue on the
Quest for International Law in Financial Regulation, September 2010.
Lastra RM, and Geoffrey Wood, ‘Causes of the Financial Crisis and Lessons Thereof’, forthcoming 
in the Special Issue of the Journal of International Economic Law, Special Issue on the Quest for
International Law in Financial Regulation, September 2010.
Lastra  RM and  Charles  Goodhart,  ‘Border  Problems’,  forthcoming in  the  Special  Issue  of  the 
Journal  of  International  Economic  Law,  Special  Issue  on  the  Quest  for  International  Law  in 
Financial Regulation, September 2010.
Noyer C, “Central Banks in the Financial Crisis” Bank for International Settlements Publications 
<http://www.bis.org/review/r090710a.pdf>
Ojo M,  “Liquidity  Assistance  and  the  Provision  of  State  Aid  to  Financial  Institutions”  (2010) 
Munich RePEc and SSRN Working Papers
Ojo M, The Need for Government and Central Bank Intervention in Financial Regulation: Free 
Banking and the Challenges of Information Uncertainty http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1624918
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Publications February 2009
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the Financial Markets: 
Key Findings” (2009) at page 10 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/22/43067294.pdf>
Rodriguez  –  Miguez  J  and  Ojo  M,  “Juridical  and  Financial  Considerations  on  the  Public  Re 
Capitalisation  and  Rescue  of  Financial  Institutions  During  Periods  of  Financial  Crisis” 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646320
Schäfer D and Zimmerman KF, “Bad Bank (s) and Re capitalization of the Banking Sector” (2009) 
Discussion Paper 897 of DIW Berlin <http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3656>
Shearman  and  Sterling  LLP,  „UK  Government  Proposals  for  Financial  Regulatory  Reform“ 
Financial Institutions  Advisory and Financial Regulatory Group Publications 7 June 2010
„SoFFin passes resolution on € 1.85 billion recapitalisation for HRE“ 30 April 2010 Hypo Real 
Estate Publications <http://www.hyporealestate.com/eng/pdf/1004recaptranch_e.pdf>
Van  Aaken  A and  Kurtz  J,  „Prudence  or  Discrimination?  Emergency  Measures,  The  Global 
Financial  Crisis  and International Economic Law“Journal of International Economic Law 12(4), 
859–894
